III. Conflict Minerals

Flickr image by Grassroots Group

The violence in Congo is fueled as demand for minerals continues. The demand has caused rebel groups and government troops to set up posts at the mineral mines. The Enough Project, which campaigns against genocide and crimes of humanity, describes how armed groups control mineral mines in the Congo:

"The majority of the violence in eastern Congo has been carried out in mineral-rich areas of the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu and Orientale. This is no accident. In remote areas that remain beyond the control of the Congolese state, the armed groups that perpetrate the violence also control much of the minerals trade. The Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR (Rwandan militias led by some of the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide), autonomous or renegade units of the Congolese Army, Mai Mai groups, and other militia groups control many mining areas, while the rebel National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP (the rebel group previously headed by Laurent Nkunda and supported by Rwanda), has profited from its control of border posts and taxation of the trade in these minerals."(5)

The militarization of the mines allows for low wages and poor conditions for miners, but high profits for rebel militias and para-military groups and for Western corporations. Estimates of profits from the mineral trade for armed groups in 2008 hover around $185 million.(6) In addition to controlling the mines, armed groups are able to demand bribes and taxes from transporters who are moving the minerals to sell; they set up road blocks near the mines or at borders.(6) Mineral traders who go to the mines to buy directly from the miners have difficulty distinguishing who is or is not a member of a militia such as the FDLR. They must pay a “tax” to the rebel groups in order to trade in the controlled area and constantly worry that the goods they purchased will be taken from them.(7) One individual mineral trader explains that “…when the FDLR loot, they become wealthy, and the people who are looted become poorer…”(7)

A tracking process for these minerals, such as the Kimberley Process for diamonds, is not yet finished. However, there are groups, such as The Enough Project and Jewish World Watch that are lobbying electronics companies to ensure their products are conflict-free by implementing a tracking process. Their argument is that if consumers demand conflict-free products, electronics companies will invest in them, resulting in more auditing of the origin sources of the minerals in Congo. Universities across the U.S. are joining in the campaign to make electronics conflict-free. As of now, Stanford University is the only one to adopt a resolution stating that it will factor in conflict-free electronics when purchasing them, but many others are not far behind, including Clark University in Worcester, MA and American University in Washington, DC.

Simply creating a tracking process for the minerals will not instantly halt the violence in the Congo. Emulating the Kimberley Process may not even be the best path to follow, given the current problems associated with it; the fact that the agreement is on a voluntary basis, meaning that monitoring is not forced onto countries, means that they can be as stringent or lax as they wish in their monitoring implementation.(8) A better process should be developed for the other minerals, learning from the mistakes of the diamond industry. Convincing those who benefit significantly from the mineral trade in the Congo to join in the process of creating stringent rules and regulations for every actor involved in the mineral supply chain to follow is quite a large feat. It will require mobilization from consumers, organizations, businesses and governments around the world.

References:

5. The Enough Project Team, and the Grassroots Reconciliation Group
2009 A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals- Strategy Paper, Center for American Progress. April 24. http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Comprehensive%20Approach%20to%20Congo%27s%20Conflict%20Minerals.pdf,  ccessed December 10, 2009

6. Prendergast, John and Sasha Lezhnev
2009 Electronics Companies and Consumers Can Help Stop Congolese Bloodshed. The Congolese Post. July 29. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-prendergast/electronics-companies-and_b_247372.html, accessed December 10, 2009.

7. Baldauf, Scott
2008 Congo’s riches fuel its war. Christian Science Monitor. November 4. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/1104/p01s03-woaf.html, accessed December 7, 2009.

8. Smillie, Ian
2005 Criminality and the Global Diamond Trade: A Methodological Case Study. In Illicit Flows and Criminal Things. W.v. Schendel and I. Abraham, eds. Pp. 177-200. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

PWPP In Context

Violence in the Congo

I. Introduction- Violence in the Congo

II. Background of the Conflict

III. Conflict Minerals

IV. Coverage of Congo by PWPP Media Partners